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Abstract  
Operators of informal transactions developed certain interest in the relaxed nature of the business as compared to 
formal transaction because of its controversial laid down procedures and probably, the cost involved. However, 
due to the relaxed nature of informal transactions, it could be envisaged that, the environment would develop 
faster since its not strictly regulated. This paper critically examines the legal process of enforcing financial 
transactions in Ghana and, in particular, how appropriate and applicable such enforcement mechanisms are to 
informal financial transactions. It also explores the interplay between formal and informal financial transactions. 
The main aim of this paper is to outline the legal implications of formal and informal enforcement mechanisms 
regarding exchanges within and between informal financial entities. 
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1. Introduction 
The absence of a defined, simple and low cost formal enforcement mechanism at the micro level and amongst 
informal practitioners has imposed an unavoidable burden in informal economies, leading to high transaction 
costs, delays and losses. The high costs of accessing formal  enforcement mechanism coupled with the 
cumbersome laid down procedures, more often than not, excludes or prevents informal agents and participants 
from benefitting from the formal system. 
Informal economies being the unregulated sector of the financial economy has within its unstructured system 
contractual relationships ungoverned by any set of rules or regulations (Portes,Castells and Benton, 1989) 
Consequently, all transactional negotiations through to completion of agreements and its subsequent enforcement 
in the event of a breach are unregulated by the institutions of society where similar activities are regulated and 
monitored by governmental institutions. It is therefore hypothesized that informal economies thrive best within 
an unregulated environment and the absence of an effective legal system or the denial of access to such legal 
enforcement mechanisms has no fatal impact on the growth of informal economies. 
 
2.0 State & Law: Essential Tools in Formal Enforcement Mechanism. 
Formal transactions are most often than not very complex in nature. In view of the fact that they are enshrined in 
legal language and form, formal financial transactions often constitute legally binding contracts. Consequently, 
such contracts can be legally enforced by contracting parties using the coercive powers of the state.  It is this 
coercive power of the state that is appropriated through the legal system to compel the compliance of contractual 
terms. The rules providing for the use of the state’s coercive power therefore constitute the law of contract. To 
this end, the state can be described as an enforcement machine possessing matchless powers of compulsion 
(Kronman, 1958). In Ghana, the Contracts Act of 1960, together with the relevant financial laws, form the basis 
of enforcing financial contracts. The ultimate controlling power in any society is vested in the state, whose 
power of control is evidenced through its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. The use of this force 
by other individuals or institutions is however limited to the extent to which the state permits it (Weber, 1958). 
The state usually serves as the sole source and controller of rights, obligations and entitlements, creating order 
and social control in any given society. Therefore, without governmental rules and powers of enforcement, 
society will be uncontrollable (Coase, 1960; Hobbes, 1909). 
Even though coercive power similar to that of the state exists in many other human institutions which are not 
states, the mere existence of such power in these human institutions does not qualify them as states and therefore 
cannot be appropriated for the purpose of contract enforcement. Thus, the feature that distinguishes a state from 
any other human institution does not lie in the existence of coercive power but the outward existence of the 
concentration of power in the hands of a separate class of people (Lenin, 1895). Consequently, it is this 
distinctive and superior power of coercion and suppression concentrated in the hands of a certain group of people 
that can be appealed to by contracting parties to compel the compliance of contractual terms.  
The concentration of the powers of enforcement in the state as well as its monopoly of the use of legitimate force 
is evidenced in both the spirit and letter of the constitutions and legal regimen of most countries. For instance, 
under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the judiciary is vested with the power to administer justice in Ghana and 
shall, by virtue of that power, have jurisdiction in all matters both civil and criminal. Pursuant to this power, the 
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judiciary may issue such orders and directions as may be necessary to ensure the enforcement of any judgment, 
decree or order of the courts (Constitution of Ghana, 1992: Articles 125(1) & (5), and 126(4)). Legal 
enforcement proceedings are therefore initiated in the courts and are governed by the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)  
as amended, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) , the Courts of Appeal Rules, 1997 (C.I. 19) 
as amended, and the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16) as amended. Disputing parties are however 
encouraged to submit to arbitration under Courts Act, the Arbitration Act, 1961, and the Civil Procedure Rules , 
whereby parties are enjoined, in certain circumstances, to resort to negotiation and settlement processes to 
resolve certain matters amicably. 
Various rules of court have in Ghana been enacted to govern the institution of an action in court. Under these 
rules, an action to enforce a contract is usually commenced by a plaintiff through the issue and service on a 
defendant of a writ of summons and a statement of claim. A defendant has eight days to enter appearance and 14 
days to file a defence to an action. Where a defendant fails to enter appearance or file a defence within the 
stipulated time frame, a plaintiff may apply for judgment in default of appearance or defence. Judgments granted 
on grounds of default of appearance or defence are usually not final and the courts are often disposed to set them 
aside upon an application to do so (C.I. 47; Kom, 1971).  
However where the writ is for a liquidated sum or damages, an application for summary judgment may be filed 
by the plaintiff, after a pre-trial conference has failed to resolve the matter, on grounds that the defendant has no 
reasonable defence to his claim. An application for summary judgment may be filed after the defendant enters 
appearance and the court may enter final judgment in favour of the plaintiff. In cases where the defendant files 
an affidavit in opposition to the plaintiff’s summons, or files a statement of defence in addition thereto, the court 
may determine the matter on its merit. The court may only enter such final judgment if the statement of defence 
discloses no reasonable defence to the action. In the event of a failure to obtain summary judgment, the parties 
may then go through the whole proceedings by filing pleadings through to taking summons for directions and 
then hearing by oral and documentary evidence (C.I. 47.). In practice, it could take about 37 proceedings from 
the issue of a writ through to hearing, submissions, writing, delivery and enforcement of judgment (The World 
Bank Group, 2009). Proceedings in the lower courts in Ghana take about 487 days to go through commencement 
to obtaining and enforcing judgment debts (The World Bank Group. 2009). This is in sharp contrast to what 
pertains in the United States, where it takes about 54 days to enforce a contract, and, surprisingly, about 1,000 
days to do the same in Poland (Djankov et al., 2002). This is a clear demonstration of the fact that the time and 
cost of enforcing contracts in courts are not measured by or linked to the state of a nation’s economic 
development, but are measured by the efficiency of the legal system. An efficient legal system therefore results 
in a shorter time as well as lower cost of contracts enforcement (Beckmann and Boger, 2002). Adjudication 
through the courts comes with some element of cost which tends to be expensive. This cost element arise from 
the payment of filing fees, service fees and fees for execution, in addition to legal and consultation fees where 
the services of a lawyer are engaged (The World Bank Group. 2009). In sum, the cost of formal contract 
enforcement proceedings has been assessed at approximately 23.0% of the claim (The World Bank Group. 2009).  
2.1 Usefulness or Otherwise of Legal Procedures in Contract Enforcement 
In spite of the noted high costs associated with legal proceedings, resort to the legal enforcement mechanism in 
the resolution of disputes often yields good results. This is because effective rules of procedure are applied by 
the courts in an informed and sophisticated manner. Furthermore, disputes settled in accordance with legal 
proceedings are conducted in a forum independent of the social environment within which the dispute arose. 
Determination and settlement of contractual claims are also provided by experts empowered and backed by the 
state (Williamson, 1975; Galanter , 1981) . According to Epstein, the availability of a legal system reduces the 
pressure on society and the parties from having to look for alternative cost effective means of settling disputes. 
This is especially true where the dispute is between parties of unequal power and strength. Recourse to informal 
and private dispute settlement mechanisms therefore seems less likely and less attractive to parties who have the 
option of a legal mechanism.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rule of law contributes to a nation’s wealth and determines its rate of 
economic growth. Studies also suggest that a well functioning legal system underlies a country’s prosperity 
(Posner, 1980; Barro, 1991; Scully, 1988). Where the rule of law does not exist or is weak, the resolution of 
disputes often depends on other enforcement substitutes. These substitutes include the use of threats, violence, 
arbitration - with or without legal enforcement of the arbitrator’s award - and retaliation including blacklisting of 
contract defaulters (McGrory, 1995; Intriligator, 1994). Even though these substitutes may provide alternative 
dispute settlement processes, they may be costly in cases where legally enforceable rights exist. The hidden cost 
associated with alternative informal dispute settlement processes is such that these processes favour simple 
contractual exchanges and not complex transactions. Whilst legal reforms are quite expensive, the cost of 
enforcing contracts outside the law in a modern society may well be colossal (Posner, 1980; Hendley et al., 1997; 
Posner, 1996). 
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Recourse to law also grants some level of satisfaction and leverage to parties with stronger and more powerful 
opponents, as the availability and neutrality of law gives them some hope of a remedy. Similarly, such powerful 
opponents may also take advantage of the law, using it as a legitimate camouflage to hide their real intention of 
pursuing weaker parties (Nonet, 1969). When considered in light of the above, it appears that the law encourages 
litigiousness in societies where both the weak and strong have access to this formal, legal dispute resolution 
mechanism. Even though the legal dispute resolution process may bring an end to disputes, it may not resolve 
disputes to the total satisfaction of all parties. To this end, the law only produces an illusory resolution and not a 
real dispute resolution, thereby creating a fertile ground for future and unavoidable conflicts (Sachs, 1973). 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of law in settling disputes, protecting the rights of the weak and discouraging the 
use of more radical and dangerous means of fighting opponents, the party with the highest access to the available 
legal resources can exploit such access to increase his edge over the weaker party. Thus, a weaker party may 
sometimes be deliberately or inadvertently excluded from accessing the legal resources and even ultimately 
prevented from asserting his legal claims or rights or defending any entitlements. A classical example was seen 
in South Africa where in 1910, and upon the formation of the in-egalitarian South African nation, non-whites 
had their legal status in South Africa erased and even lost their voting rights guaranteed by entrenched clauses in 
the law (May, 1955). 
The use of law in dispute resolution may also heighten existing tensions making them more difficult to resolve. 
This is because even though the nature of law is such that it creates social structures, roles, responsibilities and 
obligations purposely to resolve or prevent conflict, unfortunately, this purpose is often thwarted by the very 
nature of the law. In creating social structures and establishing roles, rights and obligations, existing social 
problems and conflicts are brought to light and this, more often than not, increases existing tension (Turk, 1976). 
Dispute resolution through the legal system appears to be more injurious to the resolution process, as disputing 
parties often see one another as adversaries, especially where they each insist on the legitimacy of their claim. In 
contrast, an informal dispute resolution process is usually conducted in a friendly manner. Parties to an informal 
dispute resolution process are therefore more likely to resolve issues amicably. 
Contrary to informal proceedings, the legal environment is constituted of formalities and strict procedure and 
these often make dispute resolution difficult. Further, communication, which is an essential part of dispute 
resolution, may be precluded in a legal environment since the whole process may be at risk of the disclosure of 
injurious but relevant facts (Macaulay, 1963). In addition to the above, parties who obtain judgment at the end of 
a long trial may also be faced with inefficiencies in the enforcement process and may be unable to enjoy the 
benefits of the judgment (The World Bank. 2005). It appears the above may provide a reason why businessmen 
and petty traders in both developing and developed countries feel reluctant to resort to strict legal procedures 
and/or use no legal processes at all in their business transactions. Even in a litigious society like the United 
States, it appears most contractual and property disputes are resolved outside the legal system, often due to the 
cost of legal proceedings (Clark, 2002; Posner, 1980; Macaulay, 1963).  
In spite of the difficulties encountered in accessing formal enforcement mechanisms, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that where the procedures adopted are minimal, formal proceedings produce fast, fair and affordable 
results. In their studies on contract enforcement in Ghana and doing business in 2004, the World Bank found that 
a lower number of procedures often produce fairness, impartiality, more honesty, consistency and promote 
public confidence in the legal system. Their observation in Ghana established that there are about 37 procedures 
in contract enforcement proceedings, making Ghana one of the countries with the lowest procedural complexities. 
They concluded that the existence of legal complexities and numerous processes create a fertile ground for 
bribery and corruption, leading to inefficiencies and public mistrust in the legal system (The World Bank Group. 
2009; The World Bank. 2004).  
Law, as a dispute resolution mechanism, becomes an important tool in societal control and the enforcement of 
rights, but only where legal resources or systems are available. Where legal resources are unavailable or where 
the legal system is inefficient, disputing parties have no choice but to rely on the use of non-legal power to deal 
with disputes. Law, in such circumstances, becomes irrelevant save the general recognition of the right to self-
help (Hoebel, 1954). The use of law in resolving disputes in developing economies where there are imperfect 
legal systems may be evasive, especially where their legal enforcement system is inefficient. Therefore, contract 
enforcement in these economies may not be achieved through the legal system. Education, not law, is said to be 
responsible for achieving and maintaining the basic order in these societies, especially where self-control and 
informal control systems are heavily relied on (Llewellyn, 1951).  
The legal system has not been an important part of the daily economic lives of developing societies. As a 
developing country, Ghana is no different, especially where majority of the population live in rural communities 
and often depend on the informal sector (Ghana Statistical Service. 2004; Ghana Government 1999-2000; 
Aryeetey et al, 1997). Ehrlich in his study of the fundamental principles of the sociology of law, observed that 
law is relatively unimportant and that social forces tend to produce the same norms in all human societies. One 
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can therefore conclude that social forces are compelling enough to induce normative values in man, making him 
a social animal and resulting in his compliance with acceptable societal norms without the influence of law. 
After all, contract enforcement mechanisms, which comprise of economic activity coordination and optimization 
processes, predate the state and legal institutions (Posner, 1998). This trend was evidenced in Ellickson’s study 
of Shasta County where neighbours in the county were strongly inclined to cooperate in the face of disputes. 
They achieved such cooperation not by bargaining and arguing out legally entrenched rights and entitlements, 
but by adopting social control measures and enforcing adaptive norms that trump legal entitlements. This 
informal system of resolving disputes was found to have achieved mutual advantage without any supervision or 
control by the state.  
The adoption of an enforcement mechanism in any given situation depends on the nature of the dispute in 
question and the availability of a legal system. So that where the dispute is one arising out of a technical 
transaction or evidenced in writing and witnessed by a third party and the legal system is available and efficient, 
then a resort to formal enforcement mechanism will be more appropriate. Evidently, in such situations, the 
formal dispute resolution process will be less costly and more efficient. It goes without saying that where the 
legal system is ineffective or unavailable, disputing parties have no option but to rely on mechanisms beyond the 
law (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). However, where the dispute arose out of an oral and informal arrangement, 
it may be difficult to enforce through the legal system as problems of verifiability arise causing delays and 
increasing the cost of enforcement (Beckmann and Boger, 2002). In such circumstances the powers of 
enforcement emanating from the state could be ineffective and rendered useless.  
 
3.0 Conclusion 
Despite the need for a well-defined informal enforcement mechanism in situations where the legal system is 
weak or unavailable, or where the dispute arose out of informal arrangement with no basis in law, the importance 
of the legal system cannot be overlooked if the overall social order is to be maintained. However, more often 
than not, the cost of accessing the legal enforcement mechanism coupled with cumbersome laid down 
procedures exclude users of the informal sector from accessing the legal system. Furthermore, the reliance on 
complex formalities and the nature of informal disputes make legal enforcement processes unsuitable for 
enforcing disputes arising out of informal financial transactions. Law and legal enforcement processes may, 
however, have some relevance for disputes arising between institutional agents and savers as the contractual 
relationship between them are often governed by regulations. Generally, law, including its regulatory and dispute 
resolution mechanism, may be, in substance and procedure inappropriate for informal financial transactions.  
 
References 
Aryeetey, E., Hettige, H., Nissanke, Steel, W., (1997) ‘Financial Market Fragmentation and Reforms in Ghana, 
Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania’, The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 11, no. 2 195-218.  
Barro, R. J., (1991) ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 106, MIT Press, Cambridge, no. 2 407- 443,. 
Beckmann,V. & Boger, S., (2002).  ‘Contract Enforcement in Transition Agriculture,Theory and Evidence from 
Poland’, Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics (ISNIE), Institutions 
and Economic Performance, September, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA,  
Clark, G., (2002) ‘Market Association Leaders’ Strategic Use of Language and Narrative in Market Disputes and 
Negotiations in Kumasi, Ghana’, Africa Today, vol. 49, no. 1, Indiana University Press, 43-58. 
Coase, R. H., (1960) ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, no. 1 1-44.  
Djankov,S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., (2002). Courts: the Lex Mundi Project, 
Unpublished Manuscript,  
Ehrlich, E., W. Moll (1936).. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law,  
Ellickson, Robert. (1991). Order Without Law, How Neighbours Settle Disputes, Harvard University Press, 
ISBN 0-674-64169-8,  
Epstein, A. L. (1958). Politics in an Urban African Community: Manchester University,  
Galanter, M., (1981) ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law’, Journal of Legal 
Pluralism, vol. 19 1-47.  
Ghana Statistical Service Report, (2004). 
Hendley, K., Ickes, B. W. and Ryterman, R., (1997) ‘Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises’, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 1 19-41. 
Hobbes, T.,(1909) Leviathan, Oxford University Press Ed Oxford 97 – 98. 
Hoebel, E. A. (1954). The Law of Primitive Man, Cambridge: Harvard University,  
Intriligator, M. D., (1994) ‘Privatisation in Russia Has Led to Criminalisation’, Australian Economic Review, 
vol. 105, , pp. 4-14. 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.15, 2013 
 
67 
Kom, E. D., (1971).Civil Procedure in the High Court, Publishing Division, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 
Kronman, Anthony. (1958). Contract Law and the State of Nature. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 
1(1),  
Lenin.V. I. (1895). The Economic Content of Narodnism, LCW, Vol, 419. 
Llewellyn, K. (1951) The Bramble Bush, , pp.107 – 118.  
Macaulay, S. (1963). Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55,. 
McGrory, D., (1995) ‘Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for 
Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 5, no. 1, , pp. 65-
98. 
McMillan, J. & Woodruff, C., (1999) ‘Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam’, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, vol. 15, no. 3, , pp. 637-658. 
Nonet, Philippe, (1969). Administrative Justice: Advocacy and Change in a Government Agency, New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Portes, A. Castells, M & Benton, L. A., (1989). The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less 
Developed Countries, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Posner R. A., (1980). A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law, 23 J. Law & Econ. 1, 26,. 
Social Problems, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 276-291. 
Posner, R., A., (1996)  ‘The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe and for the United 
States’, Tulsa Law Journal, vol. 32 no. 1, 1-19. 
Posner, R. A., (1998) ‘Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development’, The World Bank Research 
Observer, vol. 13, no. 11-11.  
Sachs, A., (1973).Justice in South Africa, University of California Press, Berkeley, California. 
Scully, G. W., (1988)..  ‘The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 96, no.4,652-662. 
The Business Name Act, 1962 (Act 179) 
The Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) 
The Contracts Act of Ghana, 1960 (Act 25) 
The High Court Civil Procedure Rules (L.N. 140A), 1954. 
The Incorporated Partnership Act (Act 152), 1962. 
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, (2005). “Doing Business in 2005, 
Removing Obstacles to Growth”, , A co-publication of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation 
and Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-8213-5748-4. 
The World Bank Group (2009), ‘Doing Business: Enforcing Contracts in Ghana’, [Online] Retrieved on 7th June, 
2009. 
Availableat:http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/EnforcingContracts/CaseStudy.aspx?economyid=76 
Turk, Austin. (1976), Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict. 
Weber, M. (1958), Essays in Sociology, Translated by H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills,  Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
Weber, M. H. Gerth, and Wright Mills,C. (1958). Essays in Sociology. 
Williamson, O. E., (1975). Markets nm, and Hierarchies, Free Press, New York. 
  
This academic article was published by The International Institute for Science, 
Technology and Education (IISTE).  The IISTE is a pioneer in the Open Access 
Publishing service based in the U.S. and Europe.  The aim of the institute is 
Accelerating Global Knowledge Sharing. 
 
More information about the publisher can be found in the IISTE’s homepage:  
http://www.iiste.org 
 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
The IISTE is currently hosting more than 30 peer-reviewed academic journals and 
collaborating with academic institutions around the world.  There’s no deadline for 
submission.  Prospective authors of IISTE journals can find the submission 
instruction on the following page: http://www.iiste.org/Journals/ 
The IISTE editorial team promises to the review and publish all the qualified 
submissions in a fast manner. All the journals articles are available online to the 
readers all over the world without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than 
those inseparable from gaining access to the internet itself. Printed version of the 
journals is also available upon request of readers and authors.  
IISTE Knowledge Sharing Partners 
EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP Open 
Archives Harvester, Bielefeld Academic Search Engine, Elektronische 
Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate, OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial 
Library , NewJour, Google Scholar 
 
 
